Thirty years after the Hart-CeIIer Act brought renewed immigration to the United States, the immigration research agenda is slowly shifting from the newcomers to their children. The timing is just right, as it is only within the past decade that immigrants' children have become a sizable presence in American schools, and still more recently that they have moved from the schools into the labor market. But the tenor of the times is clearly not good. America is in the throes of another debate over immigration, and this time, the parties that would narrow, if not close, the door to immigration seem to have the upper hand. An unhealthy brew of popular anxiety whipped up by politicians who can never stoop too low in search of votes lies behind the emerging trend toward restriction.
Nonetheless, there are non-partisan, scholarly reasons for worry. Many of the newcomers arrive with low levels of skill, converging on a handful of metropolitan areas that lack the resources neeaea to speea rne process or immigrant aadprauon. And these days, even me 3-3 If .l_-.__~ ____ -l?-._:___..r _,(,..r_L!-.--_.--*L_ friends of immigration will concede that serious questions have been raised about immigrants' prospects and about the costs associated with absorbing the many newcomers who have moved to the United States over the past fifteen years.
Not surprisingly, then, the emerging scholarship on the children of immigrants has begun on a note of inflected pessimism. Recent publications by Herbert Gans, Alejandro immigrants themselves --outline, with clarity and acuity, the reasons for concern: Coming from everywhere but Europe, today's newcomers are visibly identifiable, and enter a mainly white society still not cured of its racist afllictions. Shifts in the structure of the economy aggravate the impact of discrimination: while poorly-educated immigrant parents seem to have no trouble getting started at the very bottom, the shift toward knowledgeintensive jobs means that the next generation will have to do well in school if it wishes to surpass the achievements of the foreign-born. With big-city schools in more trouble than ever before, the outlook for successful passage through the educational system seems dim.
TI-..A__ T)..L_-T
As second generation expectations are unlikely to remain unchanged, we can count on a mismatch between the aspirations of immigrant children and requirements of the jobs which they seek.'
So our leading sociological commentators on ethnicity are worried about "second generation decline". Their anxieties, however, take a very different form from that voiced in the popular press: there we read that the children of today's immigrants are failing to assimilate, in supposed contrast to their predecessors of earlier in the century. She scholarly literature assures us that new second generation is assimilating, all right, but in '%egmented9i fashion, with some large, though so far undefined, proportion likely to converge with the "urban underclass."
This new perspective on second generation change emerged just as the topic of immigrants' children showed up on the scholarly radar screen. As such, it seems likely to have been designed for agenda-setting purposes, laying out a set of leads and sensitizing concepts for subsequent researchers to modify, extend, alter, and systematize as empirical work on the new second generation moved ahead. But these ideas have struck a particularly deep chord: consequently, the hypotheses of "second generation decline" or "segmented assimilation" have already assumed canonical form. As can be seen from the articles appearing in the International Migration Review's special issue on "The New Second Generation", or from any other perusal of this rapidly growing literature, the research community has taken the new perspective as conventional wisdom.2
One can only admire the persuasive power of ideas. But it does seem that a skeptical review is long overdue. While the new views present a powerful case, the core contentions rest on a set of assumptions neither adequately specified and nor beyond reproach. Moreover, the current pessimism is heavily influenced by a particular, never fully articulated view of the past, adopting an interpretive perspective that puts the contemporary situation in an especially unfavorable light. The anxiety about emerging second generation trends is also notably broad-brushed: while one can argue that some portion of today's second generation is either stalled or headed downward, the relative size of that portion is certainly relevant, and that matter is never addressed. And the underlying case for pessimism relies on a set of analogies to the experience of other, contemporary minorities that have not yet received much attention, and may not bear up under the scrutiny.
Thus, this paper takes a doubting, if friendly, look at the hypotheses of "second generation decline" and "segmented assimilation". We begin with a review of the basic approach, outlining the logic of argument, and specifying the central contentions. We then head toward the past, in search of material that will illuminate both the parallels and points of distinction between the immigrant children who grew up in the first half of the 20* century and those who will move into adulthood during the century to come. Last, we return to the present, inquiring both into the characteristics of those children of immigrant who might find themselves at risk, and the precise source of any such peril.
Second generation decline?
There is little question that many, possibly even most immigrant children are heading upward, exemplified by the large number of Asian students enrolled in the nation's leading university, some the children of workers, others the descendants of immigrants who moved right into the middle-class. The rapid Asian ascent evokes parallels with the past, most clearly the first and second generation Jews who began appearing at City
College, and then Harvard, Columbia, and other prestigious schools in numbers that discomfited the then dominant WASPS. As Steinberg (198 1) pointed out some years ago, it was the Jews' good fortune to have moved to America just when the educational system was expanding and moving away from its classical past, and to have converged on the Northeast, where opportunities to pursue schooling were particularly good. But even so, schleppers greatly outnumbered scholars, and the proportion of Jews who made their way to Harvard or its proletarian cousin, CCNY, was dwarfed by those who moved ahead as skilled workers, clerks, or small businessowners. In this light, the Asian advance into higher education remains phenomenal: in the Los Angeles region, for example, 18 to 24 year olds in every Asian group (Vietnamese immigrants who arrived in the United States after the age oflO included) attend college at a rate that exceeds native-born whites, with the native-born leagues ahead of native-born whites on this count. And ironically, the temper tantrums of "angry white men" seem likely to accelerate, rather than reverse this trend --quite a different turn of events than that which transpired in the Ivy League 70 years ago.
Even though some portion of today's second generation is rapidly ascending the totem pole, others appear to be left behind; it is this group that has attracted scholarly interest and concern. As we read the emerging literature, the obstacles to progress appear to stem from a complex of intersecting economic, social, and psychological factors. The starting point is race: since the European immigrants, as Portes and Zhou write, were "uniformly white", " skin color reduced a major barrier to entry into the American mainstream (76)." Like beauty, skin color lies in the eyes of the beholder, and as Gans reminds us, white southern and eastern European immigrants were earlier characterized as races. Henry Adams, E.A. Ross and others of their ilk were certainly convinced that the swarthy masses of the turn of the century were of a different kind; since Portes and Zhou are quite right in arguing that race, or rather the meanings associated with it, "is a trait belonging to the host society", one wonders whether levels of xenophobia and racism are indeed higher today than they were in the 1920s or 1930s --when the last second generation came of age. Still, the thinking today concludes that the "ethnic and racial discrimination" suffered by contemporary dark-skinned and non-Caucasian immigrants seems "more permanent" (Gans, 176) .
Perhaps. But the argumentation has more to do with second generation response than with the mainstream's problems with race, After ail, discriminatory practices &it by the children must surely be experienced by the parents, who, in self-presentation and cultural attributes, are far more distinct than their offspring. The children, however, respond differently: they have a heightened perception of discrimination and its prevalence; and they react to actual and perceived discrimination by rejecting the dreams that impelled their parents.
But how to account for this distinctive second generational response? Answer: the advent of the second generation yields an attitudinal shift, which in turn, stems from varying sources. One derives from the immigration process itselc following Piore (1979) , we can caii this %econd generation revoit". The immigrants arrive wiiiing to do the jobs that natives won't hold: however low the jobs may fall in the U.S. hierarchy, they still offer wages and compensation superior to the opportunities back home. Having been exposed to different wage and consumption standards from the start, the children want more;
consequently, the question is whether their "careers...keep pace with their U.S.-acquired aspirations" (Portes and Zhou, 85) .
For Piore, the generational shift in immigrant aspirations was inherent in the processes of migration and settlement and thus a recurrent phenomenon. This would suggest greater continuity between yesterday's and today's second generations, but Portes, Zhou, and Gans all argue that the mismatch between aspiration and opportunity is greater today than ever before, and therefore the greater likelihood of frustration as well (shades of Merton!) The conundrum of the contemporary second generation lies in the continuing transformation of the U.S. economy. The manufacturing economy of old allowed for a three, possibly four generational move beyond the bottom-most positions to which the immigrants were originally consigned. Even though low-skilled jobs persist, occupational segmentation has "reduced the opportunities for incremental upward mobility through well-paid, blue-collar positions" (Portes and Zhou, 85) . The declining viability of small business reduce the possibilities for advancement through the expansion of businesses established by the immigrant generation. And the general stalling of mobility reduces the chances for ethnic succession: Jews and Italians followed the Irish into the public sector as the latter moved on to more lucrative pursuits; today's civil servants are unlikely to enjoy the same options, which will close off this path of mobility to today's second generation.
Of course, the manner in which the comparison is constructed heightens the contrast between the experience of the earlier and the later second generations. The children of the European immigrants, it appears, automatically moved up the ladder, taking over the "relatively secure but low-status blue-and white-collar jobs that WASPS and the descendants of earlier immigrants would no longer accept" (Gans, 177) . The history of the earlier second generation is also removed from time, recounted in the afterglow of the prosperity of the post-World War II period, when in reality the children of immigrants began entering the labor market in the 192Os, 193Os, and even before.
Historical considerations aside, the advent of the hourglass economy confronts the immigrant children with a cruel choice: either acquire the college, and other advanced degrees needed to move into the professional/managerial elite, or else accept the same menial jobs to which the first generation was consigned. Given the aspirational shift entailed in "second generation revolt", the latter possibility is not in the cards. As Gans writes: _ If the young people are offered immigrant jobs, there are some good reasons why they might turn them down. They come to the world of work with American standards, and may not even be familiar with the old-country conditions..by which immigrants. .judged the. urban job market. Nor do they have the long-range goals that persuaded their parents to work long hours at low wages; they know they cannot be deported and are here to stay in America, and most likely they are not obliged to send money to relatives left in the old country. From their perspective, immigrant jobs are demeaning; moreover, illegal jobs and scams may pay more and look better socially --especially when peer pressure is also present (182).
The scenario has the ring of plausibility; but note the slippage in the argument. One need not have discriminating employers and "poor young men with dark skins" (Gans 182 homologs. More importantly, propinquity yields exposure to the "adversarial" norms of "marginalized youth". As immigrant children come into contact with the reactive subculture developed by native minorities, they undergo a process of "socialization" that "can effectively block parental plans for intergenerational mobility." (Portes and Zhou, In all likelihood, factors inherent to the migration process, as well as those of a more contingent nature, are at work. At the very least, theoretical clarity requires that we distinguish between the two; empirical research will also need to assess their relative importance. While both explanations yield the same effect, "second generation revolt", in the Piore/Gans view dne~ not rtyG-e the nresence of native minnrities and their
oppositional subculture. By contrast, it is not clear whether exposure to a pre-existing oppositional subculture would work in equally insidious ways, were there not an immigrant predisposition toward that point of view, born out of the frustration produced by the hourglass economy. Alternatively, the "oppositional subculture" may be nothing more than the expression of "second generation revolt", in which case the explanation founders on an attribution error. Historical evidence is germane to this question, since it would allow us to determine whether or not an "oppositional subculture" is sui generis to the situation of contemporary immigrants, for whom the "proximal host" is a visible, stigmatized, native-born minority.
Both explanations also highlight a similar factor: namely, exposure to influences outside the immigrant communities. The argument for inherent factors underlines the impact of the broader society, and its culture of consumption. By contrast, the argument for contingent factors underlines the impact of a subsociety and its distinctive sub-culture;
to the extent that the subculture reflects the broader culture in its emphasis on individualism, acquisitiveness, and materialism, the two lines of influence may be highly intertwined.
It is atso worth recalling that the type of immigrants around which Piore organized his theoretical framework began as temporary migrants and came from peasant societies.
It is precisely those origins and circumstances that account for the divergence between first generation expectations and the wage and consumption standards of the native-born.
Though the argument is never developed, it would follow that the diffision of consumption norms from host to sending countries could alter expectationsprior to migration, and therefore would also accelerate the process of second generation revolt. In that case, the new immigration may diryer from the oid in the degree ofpre-migration cultural change; if the old world communities were more isolated and more attached to traditional modes of scarcity-bound consumption, the influence of U. S. consumption patterns may have worked with a more delayed effect, making second generation revolt less intense than it is today.
In sum, the recent attempts to conceptualize the dilemmas the second generation have the great merit of laying out an important research agenda and directing our attention toward hypotheses which can be measured and assessed. While these conceptual efforts suffer from the usual drawbacks of logical consistency, adequacy of evidence, and appropriateness of the comparative frame, the main problem may simply be that the effort is premature. The children of today's immigrants may well be star-crossed; but a careful comparison at the past may prevent us from consigning them to oblivion and offer a more realistic assessment of second generation prospects and the time-honored, predictable travails they will encounter.
Second Generations Past
Given'the distinctive characteristics of today's immigrants, one might not have immigrants from all major groups, save the British, were far more likely to work at the least skilled jobs than were native whites of native parentage and all were less likely to work in white collar jobs, whether at high or low levels. Italians, Poles, and other Eastern and Southern Europeans disproportionately fell into jobs at the very bottom of the occupational ladder. Low levels of literacy --just over half of the "other Eastern and
Cnuthern Furoneans"
renorted that thev could read. and iust over half of the Italians could Paths: Today's literature begins with the assumption that yesterday's second generation followed a common upward path, of which the first step involved access to manufacturing jobs one or more rungs above the positions held by their parents. That assumption has the ring of plausibility: the immigrants themselves were recruited to staff the growing industrial complex, which in turn continued to provide a large share of employment through mid-century, especially in those regions of the country on which the immigrants of the 1880-1920 period converged. manufacturing accounted for less than a third of employment in the second generation Jewish niches in New York City, and its importance eroded severely over the following ten years (Waldinger, 1996) .
Other groups also found alternative paths of upward movement, for example, the Irish, with their reliance on the public sector (and their much greater dependence on service employment, especially among women, but still true for men as well). And though the matter has not been well explored, it seems reasonable to expect considerable variation among the very least skilled of the new immigrants of old, if for no other reason than geographic factors. The Italians, for example, were far more likely than the nonJewish East Europeans to cluster in the New England and Mid-Atlantic regions, where heavy manufacturing was not nearly as important a source of employment as in the midwest, where the Polish and Slavic concentration was especially prominent.
It's worth recalling that manufacturing peaked in New York City quite early in the century (though somewhat later in the greater New York metropolitan area); hence those children of the earlier immigrants who came of age in New York found a way upward despite a rather 
preclude the possibility that only one path can lead the children of today's less skilled immigrants upwards; but at the very least, we should be attentive to the alternatives. In any case, today's reconstruction of yesterday's upward movement is an undeniably have stayed in the labor force after they married, but many returned in later years; later cohorts certainly enjoyed much longer work careers.
We note that these generalizations are unlikely to hold in the same way for all groups; and the types of spatial variations noted above may apply with ever greater force for women, since a financial/headquarters complex like New York probably generated a much stronger demand for oflice workers than a less variegated. industrial city like Detroit _" --7
or Cleveland. At a minimum, however, a gendered view will tirther complicate our vision of earlier second generation pathways up from the bottom.
But taking gender into account is likely to do more. On the one hand, it will remind us that there was historically a feedback between changes on the demand side and the behavior of second generation groups. After all, entry into clerical employment was contingent on a different set of skills than those demanded by manufacturing, with clerical employers more likely to insist on higher levels of literacy and numeracy. . Not all groups of second generation women will have traveled up the curve of rising labor force participation at quite the same rate --and establishing these differences will again help flesh out our understanding of the complexity of earlier experiences --but
an upward curve appears to apply to most.
These historical parallels are relevant to today's debates, since progress among the "at risk" groups of the contemporary second generation is likely to be largely contingent on the labor market situation of their female members. Indeed, the historical comparison suggests new lines of inquiry to be pursued when examining the contemporary situation, since the match between second generation skills and job requirements might look much better for women and than men. Second generation women might be particularly likely to benefit from ethnic succession in "pink collar" occupations, from which native white women may be exiting as their job profile gets upgraded. One can also imagine parallels to the semi-professional and less prestigious professional positions (nurse/school taar.hCarlanAol .Ilnl-tOV\ +h"t +LP '30t-1;cx f'xn. some perspective on what we should expect of the children of the most disadvantaged immigrants today.
Mobility regimes: In the new conventional wisdom, structure is largely, if not all, determining. The descendants of yesterday's immigrants had the good fortune of encountering an economy that allowed for gradual moves upwards; the children's of today's newcomers need to move ahead in one giant step. Whether the structure of today's economy is actually so inimical to second generation progress deserves greater debate, but that is a matter for another paper. The question at hand has to do with the past.
The presentist orientation that prevails in today's discussions takes yesterday's structure for granted. But we should give the descendants of yesterday's immigrants at least some credit for the conditions that allowed for their success: unwilling to continue under the same circumstances that their parents' endured, this earlier second generation aspired to more --and got it. Their collective efforts, involving unionization and active support of the New Deal and its successors, created a mobility regime that redistributed resources in a more egalitarian way. Put somewhat differently, the sons and daughters of the unskilled immigrants of yore needed only modest educations to move a notch or two beyond their parents. But those jobs proved beneficial precisely because the ethnic laborers of the 1930s through 1960s were able to use their bargaining capacity to increase the working class share of the pie.
Second Generations Today and Tomorrow
Who is at risk? Cuban population is slow growing, characterized by a high median age and low fertility.
While it may well be the case that Cubans are all moving into the middle-class, either through a path mediated by the enclave economy or through assimilation, classical style, the quantitative import is relatively slight. And it will also get slighter, given fertility patterns and immigration trends (indeed, the Cuban share of the total foreign-born population has declined since 1990). By contrast, in the six years since 1990, Mexicans have grown from 22 percent to 27 percent of the foreign-born, with no evidence that the most recent immigrants are more skilled or better educated than their predecessors. The _ key point, therefore, is that no group is at all similar to the Mexicans in being simultaneously (1) the lowest-skilled of all the major immigrant groups and (2) the overwhelmingly largest part of the total immigrant population.
Specifying the at-risk component of the second generation, and understanding the A.,~,,-;PP hnh;nA ;tc nmr,rth ;o imnnrtont fnr nthnr t-~cacnn~ Thn oonmcmtorl ~~a~rn~lot~nn UJ11~1111V3 "~~IIIIb.4 'LJ ~'"WCLI) ,3 IIIIP"L LUIIL I", "CIIQI 'rUJ"IlJ. I1,b J~~111Wll~U UJJ'IIUI(ILL"L.
hypothesis takes the presence of at-risk populations for granted, contending instead that shifts on the demand side are the key factors changing the opportunities for the offspring of the foreign-born.
But even if the demand side conditions are changing just as the theory of segmented assimilation would predict, the impact would be a good deal less severe if Mexican-origin children were not so heavily over-represented among the children ofthe fnreivn-hnrn ___ "o__ ___--. That fact has little to d_~ with t.he rnnkleratinns nf chanvinv -I_______ ________ __ __'___~'__~ economic structure emphasized in the literature, but rather with the age structure of the Mexican immigrant population, its fertility, and the timing of its moves to the United States --factors which no one has yet unpacked. Moreover, second generation outcomes do seem to vary with other demographic factors --whether a child was born abroad or in the U.S.; the presence of other foreign-born children in the household; and the nativity status of parents. We suspect that these factors differ among immigrant groups, with the result that the assimilation process will be more advanced among some groups than among others simply because the timing of migration reduces the likelihood of a child's foreign birth and the characteristics of household structure provide less exposure to foreign-born persons. Thinking about the Cuban/Mexican comparison is instructive in this respect: a somewhat hiiher proportion of the children of Cuban parents are U.S.-born than is true among Mexicans (and U.S. birth is actually more common among Mexican than among the groups whose arrival was concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s). And migration from
Cuba has been more likely to involve displacement of full household units (as has been true for many, though not all, refugee groups), whereas the Mexican pattern has been one of seriai migration, with men forming househoids in Mexico, and then oniy much iater bringing spouse and children over to "the other side."
Educational attainment and labor market outcomes: The possibility that we have a new, expanded underclass in the making lends the edge to research on today's second generation. In our view, applying the "underclass" concept to issues of second generation adaptation is not a happy event, as the concept has been mainly successful in discussion of problems of urban, African-American poor. But whatever the problems of the concept when used on its home territory, it has traveled poorly, as it is employed inconsistently. More importantly, its invocation serves the rhetorical device of implying identity between an evolving underclass of immigrant origins and an African-American underclass, made plausible mainly because the latter's existence is presumed to be a matter ~+-C~fit \Xlhota.rnr r\n~'~ ,,;P,,, nCth a onnl;r-Qh;l;t., onA I,O&,~~PPP nCthn I,~AMPIOPP c.nnrnnt "I 14UL. *. IIc(Lb"b, "11b J "IbW "I LLIb cqJpLIu&"Lll~~ (111u uDt,*uIIIbaa "I LllcI "llU~1U143J cI"LLuqJC)
there is clearly slippage in the explanation, as the former is generally ascribed to structural changes in the environment (as in Wilson's account), whereas the advent of a second generation underclass results from cultural diffusion, notwithstanding a very different environment.
The chapter on "Growing up American" in Portes and Rumbaut's new edition of their justly influential Immigrant America (1996) exemplifies both the tenor and the cast taken by today's discussion. On the one hand, today's immigrants converge on poor, central cities, where they come "into close contact with the urban underclass." To be sure, P&es and Rumhnllt nnte that the making of this urban un&rc!ass regu!t.s from_ ----_-_---___. ..___ _----_--_ ____ ___._ ~ --_---_ discrimination and changing economic structure of the cities; but to these causes they ascribe "the development of an adversarial outlook toward middle-class culture (emphasis added);" and they also see no need to explain what the underclass is and how it differs from a lower or poor working-class of before.
In any case, geographic proximity to the underclass matters because it leaves second generation kids hanging around with the wrong crowd, not a good thing since immigrant kids pick up the wrong attitudes of their native-born peers (an argument which implicitly revives earlier theories, from the deviance literature, of differential association).
Native born underclass youth "exercise a powerful influence on newly arrived youth by reinterpreting for them the difficult conditions of adaptation....creating the conditions for a problematic mode of dissonant acculturation (248-9; emphasis added)." Through a "sociulization process" (emphasis added), newcomers' loyalties "shift toward the common adversarial stance of their native-born peers." (249) Children who pick up the adversarial stance are unlikely to do well in school. Of course, this doesn't necessarily translate into labor market disaster: after all, there are the low-level jobs occupied by their parents, supposedly so abundant. But the parents are caught in a dead-end mobility trap; and educationally unsuccessful immigrant children "run the risk of being trapped into the same low-paid occupations paid by their parents, confirming the dismal portrayals of apermanent underclass." (250; emphasis added).
That may well be; but this sort of a permanent underclass is not that the one described by
Wilson and those who have worked on the terrain he has laid out. As made clear by the Some wanted to be carpenters and bricklayers, or work for the highway road crew. Being able to survive on a blacktopping crew during the summer heat was considered a very prestigious job...It was dangerous, dirty, heavy work that only "real men" did. It was a true test of a young man's body and character.,,the vatos preferred...rough physical work..They considered working with their hands honorable...In contrast, school work was seen as boring, sissy stuff (1990: 87) As this quote suggests, the opposition between working-class students and their schools is also gendered --no surprise, as it is prefigured in such earlier ethnographic works as Gans. Relative to the factory, the high school is a more "feminine" institution, one in which women play a prominent role; as the high school also transmits skills that are more likely to be immediately valued by the employers of women than by the employers of men, mnle wnrkino-rlR<q z&!escents are g-g-e &e!v tn drift intn revnit, than their fern& ._.-._ ., ..,. . . . . . D _._"_ , ------------counterparts.
We concede that, in the past, school could be flaunted with relative impunity, as long as there was a vibrant factory-based economy, which unsuccessful students could access through the help of relatives and neighborhood-based friends. The stronger the industrial economy, the greater the value placed on manual work, which in turn sanctioned youth rebellion and gave it a ritualized form. But to make the point this way also implies that any "oppositional culture," if so it should be characterized, was a transitional phenomenon, associated with the passage from adolescence to adulthood, and fading in salience as attachment to work progressed.
And it is one thing to concede that today's factory sector is no longer so strong as 
Conciusion: Second Generation Prospects
The descendants of the last great immigration to the United States have now moved far up the totem pole; from the perspective of the 1990s it is hard to imagine that their adaptation to American could have turned out differently. their descendants. And there is every reason to think that the earlier second generation movement upward involved a variety of patterns and strategies, sufftciently complex to defy a characterization as dependent on good manufacturing jobs alone.
At a minimum, this portrait of the past suggests that the children of the post-1965 immigration begin with disadvantages no greater than those encountered by immigrant nh;lArfin h&nra Th,at nanP.-,,1;7Qt;An ;c nrnhohlw tnn ra,,t;n,,a nn the fine had the ~,LIUU, LA1 "bI"L b,. I llLLC ~brrbl c(LLLc(LL",I 1.3 p'L ""cr"'J I."" CUUL'VUJ. "11 CllV "I.V IIU.LV) b1.V immigrants' class composition is far more heavily weighted toward the middle-class than was true earlier in the century. And on the other hand, American society is more receptive to immigrant incorporation --in large measure, due to the efforts by earlier groups of outsiders widen access to opportunity. 
Mobiliry regimes:
In the main, the offspring of the 1880-1920 immigrant wave advanced through movement into a prosperous working-class. But that prosperity was, at least, in part the result of concerted, collective efforts, transforming mobility regimes from the highly inegalitarian pattern that characterized the immigrant period, to the more redistributionist pattern in place durng the New Deal era. The children of today's immigrants come of age in a different mobility regime, in which market is taking precedence over state. Good news for the children of middle-class immigrants, as well as for those many immigrant children of working-class parents who do well in school, and take advantage of the large, and relatively open U.S. system of higher education. After all, college educated persons are the winners in today's economy, which rewards the highly skilled in increasingly generous ways: the high rates of college attendance and completion among the children of Asian, Middle Eastern, and other immigrant backgrounds leave these groups positioned for improving fortunes in the new economy.
Bad news, however, for those children of working-class --or poor --immigrant parents. The metaphor of the "hourglass economy" --many good jobs at top, many bad jobs at bottom, few decent jobs in-between --provides one way for describing their problems, but it takes the structure for granted. While the supply/demand equation for less skilled workers of all ethnic backgrounds has turned unfavorable for a host of reasons, the decline of working-class power, and of the collective institutions established during the New Deal era, ranks high on the list. As in the past, "second generation revolt" could well be the engine for turning things around; and second generation rebellion need not only take the individualistic form assumed by the literature on segmented assimilation. Yet it is one thing to imagine a turn toward collective efforts at group advancement among the children of Mexican and other working-class immigrants, still another to think that those collective efforts would yield results comparable to the gains produced by the New Deal era. Perhaps, but only if current trends toward an increasingly global, increasingly competitive economy reverse. Those prospects, regrettably, do not seem bright.
